The Impossible Trinity of Denial. European Economic Governance in a Conceptual Framework

István BENCZES

Abstract


The first ten years of the Economic and Monetary Union were a remarkable success story. Nevertheless, the European financial-cum-sovereign- debt-crisis made it clear that the original design of European economic governance is not feasible any longer. The crisis compelled Europeans to admit that the implicit consent of Maastricht on a triple denial with regard to the single currency area, i.e., (1) no exit, (2) no bail-out, and (3) no default, is no longer tenable. By introducing the concept of the ‘impossible trinity of denial’, the current paper argues that pursuing these three goals simultaneously is not attainable, and that one of these should be sacrificed in order for the single currency to survive the current crisis. Also, supranational institutions should enjoy more control over crisis resolution in the future.


Keywords


European economic governance; impossible trinity; sovereign debt crisis; sovereign default.

Full Text:

PDF

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.
Creative Commons License
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences by TRAS is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Based on a work at http://rtsa.ro/tras/


Online ISSN: 2247-8310 | Print ISSN: 1842-2845 |  © AMP

The opinions expressed in the texts published are the author’s own and do not necessarily express the views of TRAS editors. The authors assume all responsibility for the ideas expressed in the materials published.