Resursele educaționale deschise ca mijloc de depășire a asimetriei informaționale dintre societate, guvern și instituții de învățământ superior – O analiză din perspectiva modelului principal-agent



Open Educational Resources have often been criticized for their lack of quality. Specifically, it could be argued that there are no incentives to publish open content of high quality, in the absence of positive or negative sanctions. In reply to this, I provide a principal-agent interpretation of the role of open educational resources. Namely, I argue that open educational resources can be employed by higher education institutions (operationalized as agents) as a means of signaling the principals (operationalized as the government, or even the society as a whole) that they are worthy and thus that they deserve funding. This might contribute as a means of reducing the informational asymmetry between the society, the government and the higher education institutions which lies at the heart of the principal- agent problem. Since second-order collective action problems might occur within the higher education institutions, I briefly analyze some solutions for solving these.

Cuvinte cheie

adverse selection, agency, moral hazard, open educational resources, signaling.

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